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Abstract
We develop an endogenous fertility model of social stratication with two hereditary classes:
a warrior elite and a peasantry. Our model shows that the extra cost warriors must incur to
raise their children and to equip them for war is the key determinant of (1) the relative sizes
of both classes and (2) the warriorseconomic privileges in terms of income and consumption.
Higher costs of warrior children imply greater economic privileges for warriors and a smaller
ratio of warriors to peasants. Historical evidence conrms this prediction. Finally, we identify
conditions under which the military function of warriors may legitimise their privileges.
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1 Introduction
Most anthropological and sociological theories of early social stratication share three recurrent
themes. First, early stratied societies divide labour between warriors, who ght wars, and peasants,
who work the land. Second, a society must be able to produce a sizable food surplus (i.e., more food
than is needed to feed the peasants and their families) in order to support a non-food-producing
warrior elite. Third, social positions in early stratied societies are, for the most part, hereditary
(Summers, 2005).
We integrate these three themes into an endogenous fertility model that accounts for the demo-
graphic forces that inuence social stratication. We investigate two issues: what determines the
class composition in a stratied society and what determines the degree of economic privilege of its
upper classes.
Our model produces a set of predictions that can be tested against historical evidence. First,
in equilibrium, the average warrior enjoys higher income and higher consumption than the average
peasant. Second, as the relative cost of warrior children increases, the size of the warrior elite
relative to the peasantry falls, and the warriorseconomic privileges increase. Third, taking land,
technology, and prices as given, total population will be lower in a stratied society.
We also identify conditions under which the military function of warriors may legitimise their
privileges. If specialised weapons are very e¤ective, or if training and equipping warriors is cheap,
the military contribution of warriors will outweigh the burden they impose on the rest of society.
We depart from previous work by focusing our analysis on individual choice instead of treating
social classes as organic units (the traditional organicist approach). The formal tools of economics
allow us to identify some of the mechanisms underlying the stratication of human societies.
The rest of this introduction reviews the sociological and anthropological theories of social
stratication and presents the main empirical regularities. It also covers the basics of Malthusian
population theory. In Section 2 we present our model, discuss its predictions, and test them against
the historical evidence. Finally, we summarise the predictions of the model and provide the intuition
in Section 3.
1.1 Agriculture and social stratication developed together
Evidence of early social stratication, mostly in the form of artefacts interred with the dead, is
rst found in the same archaeological stratum as the oldest vestiges of agriculture (Angle, 1986).
Ethnographic studies reveal that most contemporary bands of hunter-gatherers, such as the Kung in
the Kalahari or the Yolngu in Arnhem Land, are egalitarian and devoid of leadership (Boehm, 1999;
Knauft, 1994; Winterhalder, 2001). We do not know how prehistoric hunter-gatherers organised
themselves, but the observation of their contemporary remnants and the archaeological evidence
indicate that prehistoric hunter-gatherers lacked social stratication. All early agrarian societies,
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on the contrary, were socially stratied (e.g., Sumer, Ancient Egypt, and Mycenaean Greece). The
parallel emergence of agriculture and social stratication suggests that these two developments were
related in some way..
The ability to produce a surplus of food lies at the core of many theories of social stratication.
The argument runs as follows. Surplus food is required to support a non-food-producing upper
class. Agriculture has the potential to yield a surplus, which explains why agrarian societies can
be stratied. Hunter-gatherers, on the other hand, are always living on the edge of subsistence:
chronically undernourished and constantly threatened by famine [evidence of this is surveyed by
Kaplan (2000)].. They are thus unable to a¤ord a class of non-food-producers. Gordon Childe
(1942, p. 18; 1954) is the foremost surplus theorist of social stratication. Unsurprisingly, his ideas
are very popular among Marxist thinkers (e.g., Beaucage, 1976, pp. 409410; Mandel, 1962, pp. 26,
43).
Surplus theories of social stratication have several critics. Pearson (1957), for instance, argues
that all societies have the potential to produce food in excess of biological necessity. According
to Pearson, the social organisation generates a surplus and not the other way around. Sahlins
(1972/1998) maintains that the key precondition for social stratication is not the ability to pro-
duce surplus food, but the feasibility of food storage [see Cashdan (1980) and Hayden (1995)].
Without storage, Sahlins argues, there is no accumulation of wealth, and without wealth, social
inequalities cannot exist. Most hunter-gatherers are nomads. As they quickly deplete local re-
sources, they have no alternative but to keep moving. Nomadism makes storing food, and thus
stratication, impossible. It comes as no surprise to Sahlins that the few reported cases of stratied
hunter-gatherer communities are all located in exceptionally favourable ecological niches, where
the abundance of food allows for permanent settlement and thus for food storage [Testart (1982)
surveys the evidence]. The Pomo people of Central California are a classic example of a stratied
gathering society. Acorns, the staple of the Pomo diet before modernisation, were only available
during one month in autumn. During that month the Pomo gathered the acorns and stored them
for the rest of the year. The acorn stores were controlled by the chiefs (Kni¤en, 1939).
Whatever the preconditions to stratication may be (surplus, storage, or both), the emergence
of an upper class of non-food-producers remains to be explained. Two opposing explanations have
been proposed: a conict-based explanation, advanced by Fried (1967; also see Hayden, 1995), and
a functionalist explanation, attributed to Service (1962; also found in Davis, 1949, p. 367). Conict
theorists hold that aggrandisers seized control of the means of production and then used the
surplus to obtain a superior standard of living. The functionalists, on the other hand, believe that
the upper classes provide goods that benet society as whole: they lead war parties and organise
defence, build and maintain irrigation systems, store food as famine relief, and manage intergroup
trade. As a reward for their services, the lower classes allow the upper classes a greater share of
societys wealth.
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Intermediate positions have emerged between these extremes. For instance, Johnson and Earle
(2000) maintain that the intensication of agriculture and consequent population growth pose a
number of problems that can only be solved through hierarchy and the centralisation of power:
resource competition leading to raids and warfare, the risk of failure in food production, ine¢ cient
use of resources that call for major technology investments, and resource deciencies that can only
be made up by foreign trade (pp. 2932). Once power is acquired by an upper class, that group
uses its power to establish privileges for itself (pp. 266277, 301303). At the same time, the lower
classes face a trade-o¤ between the benets they derive from the public goods provided by the
upper classes and the burden of inequality net of the cost of revolting (Boone, 1992).
1.2 The rise of an hereditary warrior elite
The intensication of agriculture required people to abandon nomadism and become sedentary.
Sedentism, in turn, created competition for the most productive soils and the opportunity to ransack
the food stores of neighbouring communities. As a result, warfare escalated among early agrarian
societies (Johnson and Earle, 2000, p. 252; Rowthorn and Seabright, 2009). The mounting demands
of war triggered dramatic enhancements in military technology (Ferguson, 2003), creating the need
for professional warriors who could handle it (Carneiro, 1970; Webster, 1975). The increased
e¤ectiveness of weaponry increased the ghting advantage of warriors over peasants. It is a common
view among anthropologists and sociologists that the monopoly of weapons allowed warriors to
prevent upward social mobility and become a hereditary social class (Summers, 2005).
According to Andreski (1968, pp. 3132), a class of warriors can emerge in two ways: either by
gradual di¤erentiation of warriors from the rest of the population, or by conquest and subjugation
of another group. Gradual di¤erentiation occurs when a group manages to monopolise arms-bearing
in order to secure a privileged position in society or if the professionalisation of warriors is necessary
for society to augment its military power. Andreski maintains that conquest was the most common
mechanism of social stratication and provides a long list of historical cases to back up his claim: the
subjugation of one city by another in Sumer (p. 42), the Dorian invasions in Greece (p. 4344), and
the Norse conquest of Russian Slavic tribes (p. 62), to mention just a few. Perhaps the chemically
purest examples of stratication by conquest can be found in East Africa and Sudan. In those
regions, ample kingdoms were founded through the conquest of agriculturalists by pastoralists (p.
32). In Ankole, for instance, the pastoralist Hima conquered the agricultural Iru sometime before
the British colonisation. The Hima forced the Iru to pay tribute and allowed them no political
rights. Only Iru men were allowed to bear arms and participate in war.
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1.3 Social mobility
Betzig (1986) and Summers (2005) argue that the members of the upper classes use their privileged
access to resources in order to further their own reproduction and that of their relatives. However,
if this reproductive skewis too extreme, it may eventually cause society to collapse. The lower
classes may no longer be able to support the demands placed upon them by the mushrooming
upper classes, and the latter may fragment as their members scrabble for an ever smaller share of
the available food surplus.
The need to preserve a stable class composition puts limits on the extent to which the upper
classes can outbreed the lower classes. There are various ways in which a stable class composition
can be maintained. The members of the upper classes may voluntarily have fewer children, perhaps
in response to their impoverishment as they become too numerous; or some upper-class individuals
may become celibate and not reproduce at all; or enough of them may be killed in war before they
get an opportunity to reproduce. All of these mechanisms help reduce the degree of reproductive
skew. Some cultures have devised quite ingenious practices to restrain the growth of their upper
classes. For instance, a newly appointed Ottoman sultan was obliged by law to kill all of his
brothers. In the Central African kingdoms of Ankole and Kitara, the sons of a dead king had to
ght for the throne until only one of them was left alive (Andreski, 1968, p. 19).
The high reproduction rate of the upper classes can also be o¤set by inducing their excess
members to leave. This could be achieved by some social rule, such as primogeniture, by virtue of
which the eldest son inherits the whole family estate. The disinherited sons may sink down into
the lower classes or be forced to seek their fortunes elsewhere. For example, the descendents of the
king of Siam, except for his successors, were lowered in rank after each generation. After the fth
they became commoners (p. 19). In medieval Europe, noble scions roaming the country in search
of efs were a common sight. This surplus of nobles was the principal source of knights for the
Crusades (p. 137). The Austranesian stress on primogeniture forced the chiefsyounger sons to nd
and colonise uninhabited islands (Finney, 1996).
Note that the permanent inow of dispossessed aristocrats requires members of the lower classes
to reproduce below the replacement rate (Eberhard, 1962, pp. 264265; Lenski, 1984, p. 190).
Otherwise, the lower classes would grow beyond the point where they can provide for subsistence,
and society would starve to death.
1.4 Malthusian principles of social stratication
The size and quality of the professional army that a society can support depends on the size of the
surplus that the society can generate. In turn, the size of the surplus depends on three factors:
the number of workers, the productivity of the average worker, and the amount consumed by
the average worker and his dependents. From Malthus onward, there has been a lively debate
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on the interplay between these factors (Coleman and Schoeld, 1986; Ashraf and Galor, 2008).
The classical tradition, exemplied by Malthus and Ricardo, assumed a perfectly elastic supply
of population at a constant subsistence wage rate together with diminishing returns to labour. If
wages rise above subsistence, the population will expand, leading to more employment. That will
force down the marginal product of labour and thus wages. This process will only come to a halt
when the marginal product of labour equals the subsistence wage, at which point the labouring
population will stop growing. This is also the point at which the surplus product, in the form of
rent, will be maximised.
To the extent that the adoption of agriculture involves the development of a more costly military
technology and the emergence of a class of specialist warriors, not all of the extra output produced
by agriculture can be translated into support for more producers and their families. A fraction
of total production must be used to maintain and equip the warrior elite. This point was made
by Sauvy (1999), who argued that achieving a power optimumrequires maximising the surplus
available to support the military and the government.
How can population be regulated so as to generate a surplus in view of the limits set by technol-
ogy and the environment? The growth of the population within a given territory is determined by
a combination of fertility, mortality, and migration, the relative importances of which have varied
widely across time and geography. The role of migration is obvious and uncontroversial, so we shall
focus on the other factors.
The original Malthusian theory assumed that population is automatically regulated through
some kind of homeostatic mechanism. If the population gets too large relative to the amount of
available resources, malnutrition, famine, disease, and warfare will cause premature deaths. This
formulation is based on the biological analogy that an animal species will blindly multiply up to the
limits set by the carrying capacity of its habitat. Other formulations rely on conscious choice or so-
cial convention to limit the population. In his later writings, Malthus himself suggested prudential
restraint involving late marriage or celibacy (Malthus 1820, pp. 248252). Abortion, infanticide,
and prolonged breast-feeding may also serve to space out births or get rid of unwanted children. All
of these social practices were common among pre-modern societies (Douglas, 1966; Cashdan, 1985;
Macfarlane, 1997). Some practices were deliberately designed to limit the population, whereas oth-
ers were followed without any such objective in mind. However, even non-deliberate social practices
may have a homeostatic e¤ect. Societies compete with each other and those with practices that
most e¤ectively regulate their populations may triumph over their rivals. Thus, group selection may
lead to the emergence of population practices that are well-adapted to the prevailing environment
(Wrigley, 1978).
A controversial notion that needs to be claried at this point is that of subsistence consump-
tion. Some versions of the Malthusian theory interpret this notion in biological terms, equating
it to the minimum food intake that allows a human being to survive and produce an average of
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one o¤spring (e.g., Wolf, 1966, p. 6). The later Malthus regarded such an idea as simplistic, and
stressed the inuence of socially-conditioned preferences on reproductive behaviour (Malthus, pp.
248252; Costabile and Rowthorn, 1985). This was a common view among classical economists,
such as Ricardo (1821, p. 91).
2 The model
2.1 Overview
The main features of our model are as follows.
Two rival societies divide up a given area of land according to the balance of military power.
These societies may be stratied or unstratied.
There are two hereditary social classes in a stratied society: a warrior elite and a peasantry.
The warriors own the land and hire labour from the peasants. The peasants cultivate the land
to produce the food necessary to support both classes. Only warriors ght wars, using specialised
weapons that only they can handle. The purpose of war is to secure and extend the frontiers of the
society.
Unstratied societies do not have warriors. The peasants own and work their own land. They
also perform the military duties that warriors perform in stratied societies. Peasants do not use
specialised weapons, so a peasant militia is less powerful than a warrior army of the same size.
Warriors and peasants maximise utility by choosing how many children to have and how much
food to consume, constrained by their food income and the cost of children in units of food. Warrior
children are more expensive than peasant children because they must be trained and equipped for
war. Children and food consumption are normal goods.
There are diminishing returns to labour in food production. In the long run, population must
adapt itself to the carrying capacity of the land available.
2.2 Denitions
2.2.1 Social structure
An agrarian society called Home is composed of N > 0 adults. The adults are divided into Nw  0
warriors and Np > 0 peasants, where N = Nw +Np. Social positions are hereditary: the children
of warriors become warriors, and the children of peasants become peasants.1 If Nw > 0 we say the
society is stratied. If Nw = 0, the society is unstratied.
1We assume strong social immobility for expositional ease. We generalise our model to allow for downward social
mobility in Appendix A.1. Our results still hold in the generalised version of the model.
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2.2.2 War and land holding
If Home is stratied, only warriors carry arms and the military power of the society is proportional
to the number of warriors. If Home is unstratied, a peasant militia defends the society and its
military power is proportional to the number of peasants. Let P represent Homes military power:
P =
(
Nw if Nw > 0;
Np if Nw = 0;
where  > 1 is the relative e¤ectiveness of a specialised military technology that only warriors can
handle. In line with historical accounts, the expression above assumes that peasants of stratied
societies do not participate in war, or play an insignicant role (Gat, 2006, pp. 298299).
The total area of available land is L0. The balance of military power determines the distribution
of land between Home and Foreign:
L =
P 
P  + (P f)

L0; (1)
Lf =
(P f)

P  + (P f)

L0;
where L is the land area controlled by Home and Lf is the land area controlled by Foreign. Vari-
able P f represents Foreigns military power. (Throughout the text, we will use superscript f to
identify Foreign variables.) Parameter  measures the e¤ectiveness of military power in acquiring
or defending land. We assume decreasing returns to military power:  < 1.
2.2.3 Food production and allocation
Homes food production is given by
Y = ALN1 p ; (2)
where A > 0 is the total factor productivity and  2 (0; 1) measures the intensiveness of land in
production.
If Home is unstratied, peasants own and work their own land and earn their average product.
If Home is stratied, warriors own the land in equal shares. Total food production must be divided
between Home warriors and Home peasants. We assume that peasants earn a fraction 1  of total
food production and warriors take the rest. This allocation can be justied in two ways.
First, it could result from a crop-sharing rule established by social convention. Crop-sharing
rules were frequent among early agriculturalists (Raper and Reid, 1941, pp. 3536). Of all possible
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crop-sharing rules, dividing production between warriors and peasants in fractions  and 1   
maximises Nw and hence the military power of the stratied society (see proof in Appendix A.2).
In a warlike environment, we expect group selection to favour those social conventions that maximise
military power.
Second, the same allocation will result if labour markets are competitive. Competitiveness
implies that peasants will earn their marginal product of (1  )Y . The assumption of a competitive
labour market may seem unrealistic at rst glance, since peasants were usually bound to the land in
the past. In practice, escape was often easy, and peasants deserted their lord and sought a new one
when they felt mistreated (North and Paul, 1973, pp. 30, 79, 200). In China, for instance, massive
desertions of peasants were not only possible but indeed frequent, turning the tide of war against
the deserted lord and in favour of the new one (Andreski, 1968, p. 48).
Let p 2 (0; 1] be the probability of a peasant reaching reproductive age. Assuming that the
incomes of peasants who die before reproducing are inherited by their relatives, the income of the
typical surviving peasant is given by
yp =
8>><>>:
(1  )Y
pNp
if Nw > 0;
Y
pNp
if Nw = 0:
(3)
Surviving warriors earn a rent from land:
yw =
Y
wNw
; (4)
where w 2 (0; 1] is a warriors probability of reaching reproductive age.
2.2.4 Consumption, reproduction, and utility
People who die prematurely do not eat and do not have children. The utility of an adult is given
by
u =
1+cn1 
 (1  )1 
;
where c  0 is his consumption, and n  0 is the number of his children. The parameter  2 (0; 1)
represents the weight of consumption in utility,  is the probability of reaching reproductive age,
and  > 0 is a measure of death aversion. Consumption may not consist exclusively of food.
Both warriors and peasants may use part of their incomes to purchase manufactured goods (e.g.,
weapons) that are obtained at a xed relative price by trading with the outside world. We do not
explore this issue and assume that imports enter into the utility function in terms of their food
equivalent.
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Historical evidence suggests that fertility among pre-modern peoples depended on the income
available to them. The methods they used to limit the number of their children included abstinence,
celibacy, prolonged breast-feeding, abortion, and infanticide (Douglas, 1966; Cashdan, 1985; Mac-
farlane, 1997). Recourse to such methods was more frequent when times were hard than in good
times. To capture the link between fertility and income, we shall assume that each adult solves
max
fc;ng
1+cn1 
s.t. c+ n = y;
c; n > 0;
where  > 0 is the price of a child in units of food and y is the adults income.
The solution to an adults problem is given by
c = y; (5)
n =
(1  ) y

; (6)
u =
1+y
1 
: (7)
This is the standard result of the consumer problem with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Ex-
penditures on consumption and children are constant fractions of income, and indirect utility is
increasing in food income and decreasing in the price of children.
Children are cheaper for peasants than for warriors: p < w. This di¤erence can be read
as the extra cost that warriors face in order to train and equip their children for war. As an
example, consider the case of Spartans, who were taken away from their mothers to start their
military training as young as seven years old (OConnell, 2002, p. 42). Another example is given by
Prestwich (1996), who reports that a complete suit of armour in the Middle Ages would cost the
equivalent of a 1939 light tank. According to Andreski (1968, p. 58), the total cost of equipping
one knight amounted to the annual income of a whole village, making knighthood a heavy nancial
burden.
There is some evidence that, before modern times, warriors had a lesser chance than peasants
of reaching reproductive age. Gri¢ th (1970, p. 26) a¢ rms that one third of Norwegian kings died
in battle during the Viking era. According to Wrigley (1997, p. 206), the life expectancy at birth
among the English aristocracy lagged behind that of the population as a whole until the 18th
century, among other reasons, because the children of aristocrats were weaned earlier than the
children of commoners. Hollingsworth (1957) reports that, during the 14th and 15th centuries, 46%
of the sons of English dukes died violent deaths. The local peasants, on the other hand, were free
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from the hazards of continual combat (although they were occasionally prey to marauding lords).
In line with this evidence, we assume that w < p, although our key results will not depend on
this assumption.
2.2.5 Population dynamics
There is no migration and no mobility between social classes. Therefore, population dynamics are
governed by the following laws of motion:
Nnextw = wnwNw| {z };
Children of
surviving warriors
(8)
Nnextp = pnpNp| {z };
Children of
surviving peasants
(9)
where Nnextw and N
next
p are the sizes of the warrior elite and of the peasantry in the next generation.
Survival probabilities p and w are exogenously determined parameters. These assumptions imply
that any endogenous changes in population growth must come about through variations in the birth
rates nw and np.
2.3 Symmetric equilibria
Assume that Home and Foreign are identical with regard to preferences, technology, prices, and
survival rates. Under these conditions, the dynamics outlined above will lead to a stationary
equilibrium, the nature of which depends on the structure of the two societies. If both societies are
stratied or both are unstratied, they will end up dividing the land equally:
L = Lf =
L0
2
: (10)
The existence of a rough equilibrium among competing societies can be traced back to the early
stages of the adoption of agriculture (OConnell 2002, p. 32).
If one society is stratied and the other is not, the distribution of land will be asymmetric. We
shall discuss in detail only the symmetric equilibria. Towards the end of the paper, we touch briey
on the issue of asymmetry when we discuss the warriorscontribution to society, which is to secure
and expand its frontiers. When analysing the comparative statics, we shall assume that parameters
change simultaneously in both societies.
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2.3.1 Unstratied equilibrium
In equilibrium, warrior and peasant populations remain constant through time:
Nw = wn

wN

w;
Np = pn

pN

p ;
where an asterisk indicates the equilibrium value of a variable. The rst of these conditions is
immediately satised in an unstratied society, where Nw = 0. The second condition implies that
pn

p = 1;
or equivalently,
np =
1
p
:
The average peasant must have, in expected terms, exactly one child. Since a fraction 1   p
of peasants does not survive to reproduce, the remaining peasants must compensate by having
more than one child: np > 1. Plugging the equilibrium value of np into the solutions of the adult
problem, given in equations (5), (6), and (7), we get the equilibrium levels of income, consumption,
and utility:
yp =
p
(1  )p ; (11)
cp =
p
(1  )p ;
up =
p

p
1   :
The equilibrium value of yp is our models equivalent to subsistence income. No matter how
much the production technology improves (i.e., how much A increases), the income of peasants
will always return to yp. Equilibrium income y

p ts nicely into Malthus and Ricardos view of
subsistence: instead of being a biological minimum, equilibrium income is determined by preferences
and prices.
In the long run, the population adjusts to keep income at subsistence level. Combining equations
(2), (3), (10), and (11), we get the equilibrium level of population:
N = Np =

(1  )A
p
 1
 L0
2
: (12)
12
Observe that population is the only variable a¤ected by technology, represented by parameter A.
Technological improvements translate into nothing but larger populations:
@ lnN
@ lnA
=
1

> 0:
Initially, a higher value of A allows more food to be produced by a given amount of labour.
Peasants consume part of that extra food and use the rest to have more children. As a result, the
population begins to grow. However, diminishing returns to labour imply that population growth
will eventually o¤set the gains from the productivity improvement. In the end, more peasants will
be employed on the land, and the average amount of food produced by each of them will return
to its original level. Consumption will also fall back to where it started as the price of children
remains unaltered through the whole process. This is the typical Malthusian result when there are
diminishing returns to labour in production.
The e¤ects of an increase in the price of children, represented by p, are more interesting. Both
long-run consumption and utility increase when children become more expensive:
@ ln cp
@ lnp
= 1 > 0;
@ lnup
@ lnp
=  > 0:
Though it may seem paradoxical at rst, this result can be explained as follows. An increase in
p leads to an initial decrease in fertility and in the long run to a reduction in population, so that
fewer adults are employed on the land and hence labour productivity (yp) is higher:
@ lnNp
@ lnp
=   1

< 0;
@ ln yp
@ lnp
= 1 > 0:
When p rst increases, adults are no longer able to a¤ord their current mix of children and
consumption, so they experience a reduction in their utility. But when the system reaches the new
equilibrium, adults end up with more income but the same number of children they had before the
shock. This implies that food consumption, and therefore utility, must be higher. The existence of
diminishing returns implies that the short-run and long-run impacts of an increase in the price of
children must run in opposite directions. Figure 1 illustrates the process.2
2Under the plausible assumption that children are normal goods (Tzannatos and Symons, 1989), this comparative
statics does not depend on the particular production and utility functions we use throughout this paper. We provide
a general proof in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 1: An increase in the cost of children reduces welfare in the short run but increases it in
the long run. Point E1 represents the initial equilibrium. The income of a surviving adult is just
enough to induce him to have 1= children given the prices he faces. That level of fertility ensures
that the population will remain constant. All of a sudden, the price of children rises, so the adults
budget constraint rotates inward from BC1 to BC2. As a result, the adult moves to point E2, where
his fertility and his utility are lower than before. This short-run reduction in fertility causes the
population to decline through the generations. The decline in population increases the returns to
labour, pushing the budget constraint to the right from BC2 to BC3. Equilibrium is re-established
at point E3, where income is just enough to induce the descendents of the original adult to have 1=
children given their new, higher price. In the new equilibrium, fertility is the same but consumption
is higher than it was in the beginning. Consequently, utility is also higher.
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2.3.2 Stratied equilibrium
Both Nw and Np are positive in a stratied society. In the short run, the values of Nw and Np are
xed. Using the symmetry between Home and Foreign, we obtain the short-run equilibrium:
yw =
ALN1 p
wNw
; yp =
(1  )LN1 p
pNp
;
cw =
ALN1 p
wNw
; cp =
 (1  )LN1 p
pNp
;
nw =
(1  )ALN1 p
wwNw
; np =
(1  ) (1  )LN1 p
ppNp
;
uw =
wAL
N1 p
1 w Nw
; up =
p (1  )ALN1 p
1 p Np
:
(Short-run stratied equilibrium)
where L = L0=2. In the long run, surviving warriors and surviving peasants must have just enough
children to keep their numbers constant:
Nw = wn

wN

w;
Np = pn

pN

p :
The conditions above imply that the typical warrior and the typical peasant must have, in expected
terms, the same number of children:
wn

w = pn

p: (13)
If peasants were to reproduce faster than warriors, the ratio of warriors to peasants would contract
until warriors became extinct and the population was composed solely of peasants. Conversely, if
warriors were to reproduce faster than peasants, the ratio of warriors to peasants would expand
until peasants were no longer able to support the warrior elite. Eventually, the warrior elite would
collapse under its own weight. Hence, condition (13) is necessary to obtain a stratied equilibrium.
Substituting the short-run equilibrium values of nw and np into condition (13), we obtain the
long-run equilibrium level of population and the class composition in Home:
N =

(1  ) (1  )A
p
 1

"
1 +

1  

w
p
 1#
L0
2
; (14)
Nw
Np
=

1  

w
p
 1
: (15)
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Following Andreski (1968, p. 33), we will refer to Nw=Np as Homes military participation ratio, or
MPR.
Finally, plugging N and Nw=N

p into the short-run equilibrium values of income, consumption,
fertility, and utility, we get the long-run equilibrium values of these variables:
yw =
w
(1  )w ; y

p =
p
(1  )p ;
cw =
w
(1  )w ; c

p =
p
(1  )p ;
nw =
1
w
; np =
1
p
;
uw =
w

w
1   ; u

p =
p

p
1   :
(Long-run stratied equilibrium)
The e¤ect of social stratication on economic privilege
The average warrior or peasant must support exactly one child. These averages include people who
have no children because they die prematurely and survivors with more than one child. Because
warrior children are more expensive than peasant children, equilibrium requires that the average
warrior has a higher income than the average peasant. Let yw be the expected per capita income of
a warrior, and let yp be the expected per capita income of a peasant. These quantities are obtained
by averaging over individuals who survive and those who do not. In equilibrium we have:
yw = wy

w =
w
1   >
p
1   = py

p = y

p;
since w > p. Note that income inequality is entirely determined by the additional costs warriors
must incur in training and equipping their children.
As a result of yw > y

p, warriors will have higher per capita consumption than peasants:
cw = wc

w =
w
1   >
p
1   = pc

p = c

p:
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The economic inequality between surviving warriors and surviving peasants is more pronounced
than the economic inequality between pre-war warriors and pre-war peasants:
yw
yp
=
w=w
p=p
>
w
p
=
yw
yp
cw
cp
=
w=w
p=p
>
w
p
=
cw
cp
:
This is because warriors have a lower survival rate than peasants. Thus, a surviving warrior must
nance  1w children, whereas a surviving peasant must nance 
 1
p (< 
 1
w ) children.
The warriorsdegree of privilege in terms of utility is given by:
uw
up
=

w
p

| {z }
<1


w
p

| {z }
>1
? 1:
Assuming that warriors face a larger risk of death than peasants (w < p), the warriors degree of
privilege could be lower than 1, meaning that the peasantry would be the privileged class. This is
possible, but unlikely, as warrior children would probably shun the military career. Some form of
compulsion or indoctrination would thus be required to keep the warrior elite from disbanding.
If, on the contrary, warriors enjoy more utility than peasants, coercion may be needed to enforce
property rights or, in extremis, to prevent a peasant revolution. This is probably why the vast
majority of warrior nobilities kept their peasants disarmed. Before the westernisation of Japan, for
example, the bearing of arms was a strict prerogative of the nobles (with the very brief exception of
the Taikwa reforms period during the 7th century). It was no coincidence that no peasant rebellion
ever succeeded in Japan (Andreski, 1958, p. 50). Some authors suggest other mechanisms that
would allow a privileged upper class to subsist without coercing the lower classes. For example,
if groups are segregated and investments in human capital generate positive externalities within-
groups, then individual choices may lead to self-perpetuating economic di¤erences between groups
(Lundberg and Startz, 1998). In addition, upper-class propaganda could deceive the lower classes
into believing that economic inequalities are in their best interest (Cronk, 1994; DeMarrais et al.,
1996). Yet another possibility is that, if people tend to be inuenced by members of their own
social classes, lower-class people could just learn to play their disadvantaged role in society without
further questioning (Henrich and Boyd, 2007).
The impact of stratication on total population and military power
Maximal peasant population cannot be an equilibrium for a stratied society. When the peasant
population is at its maximum, the peasantry does not produce the surplus of food that is needed
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to support a warrior elite. To produce a surplus, a stratied society must employ fewer peasants
per unit of land and therefore produce less food than would be possible with the existing technol-
ogy. Everything else being equal (land area under cultivation, technology, and peasant subsistence
income), total population will be lower in a stratied society than in an unstratied society for
two reasons. First, stratied societies produce less food than unstratied societies per unit of land,
and less food means that fewer people can be fed. Second, the per capita income of warriors is
higher than the per capita income of peasants, so even the same amount of food would support
fewer people in a stratied society. In algebraic terms: from equations (12) and (14), it follows that
population will be lower with than without stratication if and only if
[(1  )w + p] (1  )
1 

w
< 1;
which is always true since  2 (0; 1) and p < w.
Sauvy (195254/1969, pp. 5159) argues that maximising military power requires maximising
the surplus that is available to support a professional army. In our model, the assumption that
peasants get their marginal product entails that the surplus, and hence the warrior population, will
be maximised in equilibrium (see proof in Appendix A.1). For Sauvys proposition to be correct,
it must also be the case that a stratied society is more powerful than its unstratied equivalent.
This requires the following condition to be satised:

1  

w
p
 1
(1  ) (1  )A
p
 1
 L0
2| {z }
Military power if stratied
>

(1  )A
p
 1
 L0
2| {z };
Military power if unstratied
which reduces to


w
p
 1
>
(1  ) 1 

:
Therefore, the stratied society will be more powerful than the unstratied society if specialised
weapons are very e¤ective ( is high) or warriors are relatively cheap (w=p is low).
In the long-run, technological progress in food production will only increase population
Just as in the unstratied equilibrium, a technological improvement in food production has no e¤ect
but to increase the total population:
@ lnN
@ lnA
=
1

> 0:
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This result explains why the shift from hunting-and-gathering to agriculture (8,000 to 3,000 BC)
was accompanied by the rst demographic explosion ever to be recorded (Bocquet-Appel, 2002).
The yield of the land steadily increased as a result of a series of technological improvements that
can be read as increases in parameter A: fertilisers, fallowing, irrigation systems, the plough,
and crop rotation (Vasey, 1992, pp. 44-57, 111). Suddenly, food was available to our ancestors
in quantities they never dreamt of before (Price and Gebauer, 1995). Just a few centuries after
adopting agriculture, typical communities saw their numbers grow from about 30 people to 300 or
more. Population densities increased in those places where agriculture was adopted, from less than
one hunter-gatherer per square mile to 20 or more farmers in the same area (Johnson and Earle,
2000, pp. 43, 125, 246).
The model also explains why the adoption of agriculture was not accompanied by improvements
in our ancestorsnutrition, as studies of the human fossil record have revealed (Armelagos et al.,
1991; Cohen, 1989):
@ ln cp
@ lnA
=
@ ln cw
@ lnA
= 0:
More expensive weapons imply a lower MPR and higher income inequality
An increase in the costs of weapons and military training is represented in our model by an increase
in the ratio w=p. Our model predicts that an increase in w=p will reduce the MPR, reduce
total population, and sharpen income inequality in favour of warriors:
@ ln
 
Nw=N

p

@ ln (w=p)
=  1 < 0;
@ ln (N)
@ ln (w)
=
 p
(1  )w + p < 0;
@ ln(yw=y

p)
@ ln (w=p)
= 1 > 0:
Observe that a decrease in Nw=N

p will always be accompanied by an increase in y

w=y

p. This is
precisely the main stylised fact detected by Andreski (1968): a negative correlation between the
MPR and the warriorsdegree of economic privilege (pp. 4041, 73). He observes that increases in
the cost of weapons tend to reduce the MPR and to increase the economic advantage of warriors,
exactly as our model predicts. He provides historical examples from a wide array of civilisations
(pp. 3972). We reproduce three of Andreskis examples to give the reader a taste of the historical
evidence.
Persia In the times of the Achaemenid Empire, the Persian army consisted of nobles and
freemen. The MPR was high since the freemen were very numerous. Most of the army battled
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on foot, supported by a minimal cavalry. The main weapons in use were the bow and the long
spear. Protective armour was scanty and uncommon. When the Sassanid dynasty rose to power in
the third century A.D., it introduced a series of e¤ective but very expensive military innovations;
most importantly, the stirrup and heavy protective armour. As a result, the freemen disappeared,
the warrior nobility shrunk while its privileges expanded, and the peasants were reduced to harsh
servitude (pp. 4647).
Poland The original Polish kingdom was despotic. Freemen and the kings personal guard,
the Druzhina, comprised the army. Both groups were armed with primitive weapons and did not
wear body armour. Gradually, the army incorporated more advanced equipment. Heavily armed
horsemen were the mainstay of the Polish forces that repelled the Teutonic Knights in Grünewald
(1410 A.D.). The modernisation of the army was accompanied by a reduction of the MPR and an
increase in social inequalities: peasants were reduced to the status of serfs, and military service was
restricted to the nobility (pp. 5960).
England The Norman conquest of England, which introduced heavy cavalry to the country,
sharpened social inequalities relative to the preceding Anglo-Saxon period. This process began to
be reversed during the wars against the Welshmen, when English warriors learned how to use the
long bow. An inexpensive yet formidable weapon, the long bow was far superior to any other type
of bow. In combination with cavalry, it was able to inict enormous damage on enemy forces.
The adoption of the long bow forced profound changes in military tactics and organisation. As a
consequence of these changes, serfdom virtually disappeared from England, yeomen thrived, the
MPR increased, and social inequality became much less pronounced (pp. 6465).
2.4 The social contribution of warriors
In our model, warriors provide the public good of extending the frontiers of the society and defending
it against foreign predators. In real life, these military functions may legitimise the warriors
privileges.
Suppose that Home and Foreign are in symmetric, long-run equilibrium. Also suppose there is
a peasant revolution in Home that occurs just after the end of the harvest. All of Homes warriors
are killed o¤ during the revolution. To make up for the lack of warriors, the emancipated peasants
form a militia to which everyone belongs. This militia makes no use of specialised weapons, so each
peasant is equal in ghting capacity to 1= warriors (where  > 1). Membership in this militia
does not interfere with agricultural production.
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The immediate impact of the revolution is to increase the standard of living of the peasants,
who no longer have to pay a tribute to the warrior elite. From equation (3) it follows that
byp = yp
1   > yp;
where byp is the post-revolution peasant income.
The revolution in Home will a¤ect fertility and the balance of military power. Fertility will
rise because peasants use part of their extra income to have more children, thereby increasing the
number of peasant mouths to be fed in the next generation. The e¤ect of the revolution on the
military capacity of Home is ambiguous. Because of population growth, Home will have a larger
peasant militia in the next generation. However, Home will no longer have specialised warriors to
ght on its behalf. If Home emerges militarily stronger because of the peasant revolution, it will
seize part of Foreigns land to the benet of its own population. Conversely, if Home is weakened
militarily by the revolution, it will be forced to give up some land to its neighbour.
Taking all of the above into account, the per capita income of the next generation of peasants
will be:
ynextp =
yp
(1  )1 
 
2(w=p)

(w=p) + ()

!
:
Therefore, peasants will be worse o¤ than before the revolution if and only if


w
p
 1
>
1

 
2  (1  ) 1 
(1  ) 1 
! 1

: (16)
If this inequality holds, the social contribution of warriors will outweigh the burden they impose on
society. This requires specialised weapons to be very e¤ective (a high ) or training and equipping
warriors to be relatively cheap (a low w=p). See the full derivation of these results in Appendix
A.4.3 ,4
3 In this example, the role of the warrior elite is similar to that of the king in Grossman (2002). In his
model, a privileged elite provides a public service whose benets to the rest of the population outweigh the cost
of supporting the elite. There are, however, two di¤erences between our model and Grossmans. In Grossmans
model, the elite defends producers against internal predators who would otherwise steal part of their output. In
our model, the elite defends producers against external predators. A second di¤erence concerns the duration of the
benets. In Grossmans model, the policing activities of the elite ensure a permanently higher standard of living for
producers, whereas in our model endogenous population change will eventually bring the standard of living back to
the subsistence level.
4 In a related paper, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) model the transition from a nondemocratic society controlled
by a rich elite to a democracy. They nd that the poor will threaten to revolt when the cost of revolting is low; for
example, during recessions. This threat may force the elite to democratise. On the other hand, the redistributive
nature of democratic regimes may encourage the elite to mount a coup. The more unequal the distribution of
resources, the more likely it is that society will end up oscillating between democratic and nondemocratic regimes.
Unlike our model, Acemoglu and Robinsons work does not account for the e¤ects of demographic forces.
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3 Concluding remarks
Our model produces three main predictions:
1. The average warrior enjoys higher income and higher consumption than the average peasant.
In the long run, the average warrior and the average peasant must each have exactly one
child. Otherwise, the absolute and relative sizes of the two classes will not be stable. Because
warrior children are more expensive than peasant children, warriors must receive extra income
in order to persuade them to have the same expected number of children as peasants. Since
children and food are normal goods, warriors spend some of their extra income on food and
hence on average enjoy a higher level of consumption than peasants.
2. As the relative cost of warrior children increases, the size of the warrior elite relative to the
peasantry falls and the warriors economic privileges increase. An increase in the price of
warrior children will initially push warrior fertility below one. In order to restore equilibrium,
the per capita income of warriors must rise to the point where they are again willing to
replenish their numbers. This is accomplished by reducing the size of the warrior elite: the
reduction in warrior fertility induces a decline in warrior population, and as land is divided
among fewer warriors than before, each will earn a bigger rent. Since consumption is a normal
good, part of this bigger rent will be used to nance the more expensive children and part
will be destined to nance more consumption.
3. Taking land, technology, and prices as given, total population will be lower in a stratied
society than in an unstratied society. There are two reasons for this. First, a stratied
society employs fewer people per unit of land and therefore produces less food on a given land
area than its unstratied equivalent. Less food means fewer people can be fed. Second, the
per capita income of warriors is higher than the per capita income of peasants, so even the
same amount of food would support fewer people in a stratied society.
These predictions hold even in the presence of downward social mobility. See Appendix A.1 for
a formal proof.
Our model also identies conditions under which the peasantry benets from the existence of
a warrior elite. Consider a stratied society in which a peasant revolution eliminates the warriors.
The immediate impact of the revolution will be to increase the per capita income of peasants, who
no longer have to pay a tribute to the warriors. However, without warriors to defend them, the
emancipated peasants may become vulnerable to external predation and be forced to give up part
of their land to the predators. Under certain parameter combinations, the resulting loss will be so
great that peasants become worse o¤ than before the revolution. This will be the case if specialised
weapons are very e¤ective or if training and equipping warriors is cheap. In the long run, however,
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the Malthusian population dynamics will undo any change in the peasant standard of living brought
about by a revolution or, conversely, by stratication.
A Appendices
A.1 Robustness of our results to downward social mobility
The assumption of strong social immobility is a good approximation to the state of a¤airs in early
stratied societies (Kautsky 1997, p. 95). Nevertheless, some degree of downward social mobility
was always observed (Lenski 1984, p. 289291; Eberhard 1962, pp. 264265). Here we introduce
downward social mobility into our model. It turns out that our results are robust to this extension.
Assume that adults can raise two kinds of children: some destined to be warriors, others to be
peasants. Dene the adults utility as follows:
u =
1+c

'wm
 + 'pn

 1 

 (1  )1 
:
Parameters 'w; 'p > 0 represent the weights of both types of children in utility. We set  > 1,
which means that the adult values child variety.
When maximising his utility, a warrior faces the following budget constraint:
yw = cw + w (mw + nw)
In line with the historical evidence (Lenski 1984, p. 28991), we preclude upward social mobility:
mp = 0. Thus, the peasants budget constraint is given by:
yp = cp + pnp;
Finally, let population dynamics be governed by the following laws of motion:
Nnextw = mwwNw; (17)
Nnextp = nwwNw + nppNp: (18)
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The solution of a peasants optimisation problem is the same as in the case of strong social
immobility:
cp = yp; (19)
mp = 0; (20)
np =
(1  ) yp
p
: (21)
The solution of a warriors optimisation problem, on the other hand, is given by
cw = yw; (22)
mw =
Z (1  ) yw
w
; (23)
nw =
(1  Z) (1  ) yw
w
; (24)
where
Z = '
1
1 
w

'
1
1 
w + '
1
1 
p
 1
2 [0; 1]
Strong social immobility can be modelled as the limiting case in which Z = 1.
Combining equations (3), (4), and (17)(24), we obtain the equilibrium values of the MPR and
economic inequality:
Nw
Np
=
Z
(1  Z)+ (1  ) wp
;
yw
yp
=
(1  Z)+ (1  ) wp
(1  )Z :
It follows directly that
@ ln
 
Nw=N

p

@ ln (w=p)
< 0;
@ ln(yw=y

p)
@ ln (w=p)
> 0;
as desired.
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A.2 A crop-sharing rule that maximises military power
Suppose that warriors take a share  of total food production, Y . This leaves (1 )Y to be divided
among pNp surviving peasants. The income of a typical peasant is therefore:
yp =
(1  )Y
pNp
:
From equation (6) we know that
np =
(1  )yp
p
:
Also recall that total production is Y = ALN1 p . Hence,
pnp =
(1  )(1  )ALN p
p
:
Long-run equilibrium requires pnpN

p = N

p . From this condition and the above equations, it
follows that
Np =

(1  )(1  )AL
p
 1

:
Rearranging terms, we get the amount of food taken by the warrior elite:
Surplus = Y = (1  ) 1 

1  
p
 1 

LA
1
 :
The right-hand side of the above equation is maximised by making  = . Since Nw is proportional
to the available surplus, Nw will also be maximal.
A.3 Comparative statics with a general utility function
Assume that the utility of a typical adult is given by function u(c; n), where c  0 is the adults
consumption and n  0 the number of his children. Function u is strictly increasing in both its
arguments and also quasi-concave. The adult maximises his utility by choosing c and n, subject to
the budget constraint c + n  y. Parameter   0 represents the price of children, and y  0 is
the adults income. Utility maximisation yields the following rst order condition:
un
uc
= ; (25)
where the subscripts denote partial di¤erentiation.
The model in the text assumes that fertility must converge in the long run to a certain level
n (= 1=) that keeps the population constant. This demographic equilibrium is achieved through
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the interplay of two forces: demographic pressures and diminishing returns to labour. These two
forces will carry y to a value that induces adults to choose n = n, given price . That means that
the long-run value of c is fully determined by the following expression:
un(c; n)
uc(c; n)
= ;
What happens if the price of children increases? Di¤erentiating the above expression with
respect to c and rearranging yields
@c
@
=

@
@c

un(c; n)
uc(c; n)
 1
:
Hence, long-run consumption will be an increasing function of  if and only if
@
@c

un(c; n)
uc(c; n)

> 0: (26)
Condition (26) can be interpreted in terms of indi¤erence curves, as shown in Figure 1. The
condition states that the slope of the indi¤erence curve must be atter at E3 than at E1. Observe
that, if condition (26) holds, long-run utility will also rise when  increases, simply because uc > 0.
A bit of algebra proves that condition (26) will hold if children are normal goods. First, we use
rst order condition (25) to reformulate condition (26) as follows:
@
@c

un
uc

=
ucn
uc
  unucc
u2c
=
unc   ucc
uc
> 0:
Since uc > 0, the above inequality reduces to
unc   ucc > 0:
On the other hand, the e¤ect of income on the adults demand for children is given by
dn
dy
=
ucn   ucc
 2ucc + 2ucn   unn : (27)
Since u is quasi-concave and  = un=uc, the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (27)
must be positive. Therefore, children will be normal if ucn   ucc > 0, a condition that subsumes
condition (26).
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A.4 Derivation of inequality 16
Home and Foreign are in symmetric long-run equilibrium:
Nfp = N

p (28)
Nfp = N

w =

1  

w
p
 1
Np ; (29)
where we have used equation (15). Immediately following the revolution, the per capita income of
peasants increases to: byp = yp
1   > yp;
where the hat denotes the post-revolution value of a variable [here we have used eq. (3)]. Since
fertility is proportional to per capita income [see eq. (6)], it follows that immediately after the
revolution peasant fertility rises to
bnp = np
1   > np;
where np is pre-revolutionary fertility. From equation (9), it follows that the population in the next
period will be
Nnextp = pbnpNp = pnp1  Np
But Home was in long-run equilibrium before the revolution, so pnp = 1. Hence,
Nnextp =
Np
1   > Np: (30)
Foreign did not experience a revolution, so there is no initial change in the per capita incomes
or population sizes of either of its social classes. Thus, in the next period
Nf,nextw = N
f
w =

1  

w
p
 1
Np: (31)
Since each peasant is equal in ghting capacity to 1= warriors, relative military power in the next
period will be:
P f,next
P next
=
Nf,nextw
Nnextp
= 

w
p
 1
;
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where we have used equations (29), (30), and (31). The area of land controlled by Home in the
next period is given by equation (1):
Lnext =
(P next)
(P next) + (P f,next)
L0:
Before the peasant revolution, the area of land controlled by Home was L = L0=2. Substituting
into the two previous equations yields:
Lnext
L
=
2(w=p)

(w=p) + ()

: (32)
Homes per capita income in the next period will be:
ynextp = A

Lnext
Nnextp

; (33)
while before the revolution it was:
yp = (1  )A

L
Np

: (34)
Dividing equation (33) by equation (34) yields:
ynextp
yp
= (1  ) 1

LnextNp
LNnextp

;
and from equations (30) and (32), it follows that:
ynextp
yp
=
1
(1  )1 
 
2(w=p)

(w=p) + ()

!
Therefore, ynextp < yp if and only if

p
w
>
1

 
2  (1  ) 1 
(1  ) 1 
! 1

:
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